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The Earned Income Tax Credit generates large average tax refunds
for low-income parents, and these refunds are distributed in a narrow
time frame. I rely on this plausibly exogenous source of variation in
liquidity to investigate the eﬀect of cash-on-hand on unemployment du-
ration. Among EITC-eligible women, unemployment spells beginning
just after tax refund receipt last longer than unemployment spells be-
ginning at other times of year. There is no evidence that tax refund
receipt is associated with longer unemployment duration for men, or
that the longer durations for women are associated with higher-quality
subsequent job matches.
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1The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has grown to be an important part
of the safety net for low-income families. In 2003, EITC-recipient households
received payments averaging $150 per family per month, while the average
TANF-recipient household received $140 in monthly welfare beneﬁts and the
average food stamp participant got beneﬁts of $80 per month (Congressional
Budget Oﬃce 2005). Although most transfer programs deliver beneﬁts in peri-
odic payments spread over time, EITC payments typically arrive in one annual
lump sum. Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano (2006) point out that for many
EITC recipients, their federal tax refund will be the single largest payment
received during the year. As a result, EITC recipients tend to have temporar-
ily high levels of liquid assets just after tax refunds are distributed. Building
on recent evidence showing that higher levels of liquid assets are associated
with longer unemployment spells, this paper uses refund-related variation to
investigate the sensitivity of unemployment duration to cash-on-hand among
low-income parents.
The distinctive pattern of EITC-related tax refunds received by low-income
parents provides the foundation for my empirical strategy. Low income families
with children receive tax refunds that are large relative to their annual income.
Averaged over 1993 to 2007, ﬁlers with children and with income in the EITC
range received refunds equal to 30% of their annual adjusted gross income.
Payment of tax refunds is more temporally concentrated for low-income ﬁlers
than for the population as a whole. In recent years more than half of EITC
payments have been made in the month of February. This pattern of large
lump sum payments delivered in a narrow window of time generates plausibly
exogenous variation in cash-on-hand across diﬀerent calendar months.
Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
I compare demographically similar EITC-eligible individuals who enter unem-
ployment at diﬀerent times. Individuals who become unemployed in February
will typically receive tax refunds shortly after their entry into unemployment.
Those who become unemployed in, say, July or August will generally not re-
ceive tax refunds during the ﬁrst several months of unemployment. I estimate
hazard models of re-employment, controlling for the month of entry into un-employment. I ﬁnd evidence that unemployment spells beginning around the
time of tax refund receipt are longer, but only among women. Among mothers
with low levels of income and education, unemployment spells that begin in
February have about a 26% lower hazard rate of re-employment than do spells
beginning at other times. This corresponds to spells that are about four weeks
longer on average. Despite this longer period of job search, I ﬁnd no evidence
that subsequent jobs are of higher quality. Unemployment spells beginning
in February are not associated with greater pre- to post-unemployment wage
gains or with other measures of job quality.
Relying on seasonal variation raises the concern that it is something else
about February, rather than higher levels of cash-on-hand associated with tax
refunds, generating longer unemployment durations. I address this concern
in two ways. First, I use variation in the predicted size of EITC payments.
Entering an unemployment spell in February has a more negative eﬀect on the
re-employment hazard rate for individuals eligible for larger EITC payments.
Second, I consider three groups who are similar to my primary sample in
certain ways but who receive smaller average tax refunds—parents with income
somewhat above the EITC range, low-income individuals without children,
and low-income parents observed in earlier years when the EITC was less
generous. In these groups, beginning an unemployment spell in February is
not associated with longer unemployment duration.
Understanding transitions out of unemployment for low-income parents
with low levels of education is particularly important for three reasons. First,
unemployment is prevalent among this group. When the unemployment rate
was at a relatively high level of 9.3% in 2009, the unemployment rate was
nearly twice as high (18.2%) for those with less than a high school diploma.
Individuals with low levels of education have been disproportionately aﬀected
by recessions over the last three decades (Allegretto and Lynch 2010). Second,
low levels of education and income prior to unemployment are associated with
lower rates of unemployment insurance (UI) receipt during an unemployment
spell. Only about 20% of the unemployment spells in my sample involve re-
ceipt of UI beneﬁts. As there is evidence that UI helps to smooth consumptionduring an unemployment spell (Gruber 1997, Bloemen and Stancanelli 2005),
the unemployment spells considered here are likely associated with large rel-
ative declines in consumption and potentially large welfare losses. Third, the
unemployment of a parent can have negative eﬀects on his or her children.
Recent evidence on short-run consequences of fathers’ job losses indicates a
negative eﬀect on babies’ birth weights (Lindo forthcoming) and on children’s
secondary-school grade point averages (Rege et al. forthcoming). Maternal
job loss is associated with more frequent problem behaviors in the classroom
among low-income preschool children (Hill et al. 2011), and job losses of a
household head are associated with an increased probability that a child re-
peats a grade (Stevens and Schaller 2011).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 formalizes the relationship be-
tween cash-on-hand and job search behavior, and describes existing evidence
on the nature of this relationship. Section 2 documents three facts about the
tax refunds of EITC recipients that are critical for my empirical strategy: Tax
refunds are large, they arrive in a well-deﬁned and narrow time frame, and the
money is spent down quickly. Section 3 outlines my empirical strategy, section
4 describes the SIPP data I use, and section 5 presents results and discussion.
Section 6 concludes.
1 Literature Review
In this section I brieﬂy describe a theoretical model that has been used to
explain how cash-on-hand can aﬀect job search behavior. The key prediction
of the model is that an increase in wealth reduces job search eﬀort. Adapting
this prediction to the case of tax refunds, search eﬀort is predicted to be
lower just after a tax refund is received. In the remainder of this section I
review existing empirical evidence on the relationship between cash-on-hand
and unemployment, and on other behaviors aﬀected by receipt of infrequent
cash payments.1.1 A Model of Cash-on-Hand and Job Search
Lentz and Tranaes (2005) develop a model in which individuals move between
employment and unemployment, jointly choosing job search eﬀort and savings.
With the assumption that utility is additively separable in consumption and
search eﬀort, their model generates the prediction that search eﬀort declines
as wealth increases. This model has been adapted and used by Card, Chetty,
and Weber (2007) and Chetty (2008) in their studies of cash-on-hand and
labor market behavior. I borrow liberally from these papers in the following
description.
Consider an individual who becomes unemployed at time t = 0. He chooses
job search intensity st, normalized so that st is equal to the probability of
ﬁnding a job in period t. Searching has a cost of ψ(st), assumed to be increasing
and convex. If the individual ﬁnds a job, he starts work immediately and earns
an exogenously ﬁxed wage of w in that period. If employed in period t, his
consumption is ce
t. If he does not ﬁnd a job, he receives a beneﬁt of b from the
unemployment insurance system and his consumption is cu
t. His ﬂow utility
in period t is u(ct)   ψ(st). This individual has a subjective discount rate of
δ and faces an interest rate of r. Let At denote the value of assets held at the
beginning of period t.
If an individual has a job at time t, his value function conditional on having














where L is a lower bound on assets, consistent with facing a borrowing con-














Here Jt is the expected value of entering period t without a job, deﬁned as
Jt(At) = max
st
st  Vt(At) + (1   st)  Ut(At)   ψ(st). (3)A person who is unemployed chooses search eﬀort to maximize his expected




t) = Vt(At)   Ut(At). (4)
Intuitively, a person exerts eﬀort just until the marginal cost of search is equal
to the marginal beneﬁt of search, the diﬀerence between utility in the employed
and unemployed states.
This ﬁrst order condition can be diﬀerentiated to show the eﬀect of changes










Lentz and Tranaes show that, with the assumption that utility is additively
separable in consumption and search eﬀort, the numerator of this term will be
negative. Thus, search eﬀort falls as wealth increases. This model can easily
be applied to the case of tax refund receipt. I argue that the concentrated dis-
bursement of EITC-related refunds in February generates temporarily higher
values of At. I test whether search intensity is lower at this time, as measured
by lower hazards of exiting from unemployment and longer unemployment
durations.
1.2 Previous Empirical Evidence
The prediction that higher levels of liquid assets are associated with longer
unemployment spells has been tested by two earlier papers. Card, Chetty,
and Weber (2007) take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in eligibility for
government-ﬁnanced severance pay in Austria. Individuals who have been
working for 36 consecutive months prior to job loss are eligible for a lump-
sum severance payment equal to two months of pre-tax income. Individuals
with slightly shorter job tenure are ineligible for severance pay. The authors
ﬁnd that the hazard rate of ﬁnding a new job in the ﬁrst twenty weeks of
unemployment is 8 to 12% lower for those who are just barely eligible forseverance pay relative to those just barely ineligible.
Chetty (2008) uses two datasets to document the role of cash-on-hand in
determining unemployment duration. Using data from the SIPP, he shows that
the well-established positive relationship between state UI generosity and un-
employment duration is much stronger in households with low cash-on-hand,
as measured by net liquid wealth. Using a survey of job losers, he ﬁnds that
recipients of severance payments have substantially longer average unemploy-
ment spells. Chetty uses this evidence to decompose the overall eﬀect of UI
generosity on unemployment spell length into a moral hazard eﬀect and a
liquidity eﬀect. The moral hazard eﬀect occurs when UI beneﬁts lower an in-
dividual’s private marginal cost of leisure to a level below the social marginal
cost of leisure, and the individual chooses an unemployment duration longer
than what is socially optimal. The liquidity eﬀect can occur when borrow-
ing constraints prevent an individual from perfectly smoothing consumption
over a period of unemployment. If UI lengthens an unemployment spell by
relaxing a borrowing constraint, the longer unemployment duration represents
a socially beneﬁcial response. Chetty ﬁnds that the non-distorting liquidity
eﬀect accounts for about 60% of the relationship between UI generosity and
spell length.
Chetty acknowledges that variation in At stemming from either receipt of
a severance payment or from diﬀerences in net liquid wealth is likely endoge-
nous to unobserved individual characteristics, some of which may also aﬀect
unemployment duration. For example, individuals with high levels of impa-
tience may accumulate lower net wealth and have also been shown to exert less
search eﬀort during an unemployment spell, leading to lower unemployment
exit rates (DellaVigna and Paserman 2005). My paper adds to the existing
literature by using variation in cash-on-hand that is plausibly exogenous to
unobserved characteristics.
Examining the responsiveness of job search behavior to changes in cash-
on-hand builds on the very large literature testing the permanent income hy-
pothesis. Under this hypothesis, the arrival of an anticipated and transitory
lump sum should not change an individual’s level of consumption. Japelliand Pistaferri (2010) review papers testing this prediction. While the result-
ing estimates range over a wide spectrum, those that make use of tax-related
changes in income typically ﬁnd a substantial consumption response. Souleles
(1999) relies on a distinctive temporal pattern of tax refund receipt similar to
what I use in this paper. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey (CEX) spanning years 1980 to 1991, Souleles estimates that between 34
and 64 cents of each dollar of tax refund is spent within a quarter, with the
consumption response concentrated on durable goods.1 This ﬁnding has an
important implication for my analysis. If refunds are spent down slowly, then
an EITC recipient who loses her job two or three months after receiving a
refund may have nearly as much cash on hand at the time of job loss as an
EITC recipient who loses her job in February. The substantial MPC found by
Souleles suggests instead that an individual who begins unemployment a few
months after refund receipt will have already spent most of her refund.
There are several closely related papers that study the consumption re-
sponse to one-time tax rebate programs designed to provide ﬁscal stimulus.
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) ﬁnd that the average household spent
20 to 40% of its 2001 tax rebate on non-durable goods in the 3-month period
in which the payment arrived. Households with incomes in the bottom third
of the distribution, earning less than about $34,000, spent down their rebates
much more quickly. They spent about 76% of the rebate on non-durables in
the 3-month period in which the rebate was received. Parker et al. (2011)
perform a similar analysis of the 2008 tax rebates, ﬁnding that the average
household spent between 50 and 90% of the rebate within a 3-month period.
Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007) use panel data on credit card accounts to
study responses to the 2001 rebates. They ﬁnd that the average credit card
holder paid down debt shortly after rebate receipt but eventually increased
1Hsieh (2003) ﬁnds that residents of Alaska, who receive large and predictable annual
payments from the Alaska Permanent Fund, do not adjust their consumption upon receipt
of such payments. In contrast, the same households do display excess sensitivity of con-
sumption upon receiving income tax refunds. Hsieh argues that the greater consumption
response out of tax refunds may be due to the smaller size of these payments, and hence
the lower utility cost associated with failing to smooth.spending. Nine months after receiving a rebate, credit card spending had
increased by over 40% of the typical rebate amount.
Other research has focused more speciﬁcally on how the consumption of
low-income families responds to tax refunds. Barrow and McGranahan (2000)
use CEX data from 1982 to 1996 to investigate seasonal patterns of consump-
tion among low-income individuals. They ﬁnd that, in the month of February,
EITC-eligible households spend about 3 percent more overall and about 9 per-
cent more on durable goods than do non-EITC-eligible households. Adams,
Einav, and Levin (2009) use data from an auto company on the loan applica-
tions of low-income individuals with poor credit histories. Among low income
ﬁlers with two or more dependents, precisely the group receiving large EITC
payments, the number of loan applications is twice as high in February as in
other months. The number of new car purchases is about three times as high
in February as in other months.
Behaviors other than consumption are also aﬀected by the timing of income
receipt. Dobkin and Puller (2007) show that drug-related hospital admissions
increase at the beginning of each month. Using administrative data from
California, they link patient records with information on government trans-
fer payments. They ﬁnd that the within-month cycle of drug admissions is
concentrated among SSI and DI recipients, who receive their payments on the
ﬁrst and third days of the month. Foley (2011) investigates the relationship
between welfare payments and crime. In cities where welfare payments are
concentrated at the beginning of the month, crimes with some ﬁnancial bene-
ﬁt (such as burglary and motor vehicle theft) are relatively less common in the
ﬁrst ten days of the month and increase later in the month. This pattern is not
evident in cities with more staggered welfare payment schedules, or for crimes
without an obvious ﬁnancial motivation. Evans and Moore (forthcoming) ﬁnd
that death rates are about one percent above average in the ﬁrst few days
of a calendar month, and about one percent below average in the last week
of a month. This monthly cycle in mortality is stronger among individuals
with low levels of education, who are more likely to be credit-constrained. If
cash-on-hand can aﬀect the quite irreversible outcome of mortality, it seemsplausible that it may aﬀect lower-stakes outcomes such as job search behavior.
2 Tax Refunds and Cash-on-Hand
The empirical strategy I employ in this paper depends on tax refunds gener-
ating substantial and systematic diﬀerences in cash-on-hand across diﬀerent
months of the year. In this section I document three key facts about EITC
recipients that motivate my empirical strategy. First, I show that EITC recipi-
ents receive tax refunds that are quite large relative to their annual income. In
terms of the model of section 1.1, a large tax refund generates large variation
in At. Second, I show that the refunds of EITC recipients are disbursed in a
narrow and well-deﬁned window of time. Third, I argue that EITC recipients
spend down their refunds quickly. The second and third facts allow me to
characterize the month of February as a time of temporarily high At relative
to other months of the year.
2.1 Refunds are Large for EITC Recipients
Filers with earnings in the EITC range receive larger refunds than ﬁlers with
slightly higher earnings, and low-income ﬁlers with children receive substan-
tially larger refunds than do low-income ﬁlers without children. This reﬂects
both a higher propensity to receive a refund at all and a larger dollar value
conditional on refund receipt. Figure 1 documents this pattern using data from
the 1993-2007 Statistics of Income cross-sectional samples of tax returns.2 The
sample is restricted to non-dependent ﬁlers with real adjusted gross income
(AGI) between $0 and $33,000, measured in real 2007 dollars. This matches the
income cutoﬀ I later apply to my SIPP sample. On average, 91% of low-income
ﬁlers with children receive a refund. In contrast, only 69% of low-income ﬁlers
without children receive refunds. Averaging across those who receive a refund
and those with a balance due, the mean real refund amount for ﬁlers with
2I am grateful to Laura Kawano of the Treasury Department’s Oﬃce of Tax Analysis for
providing these tabulations.children steadily grows from $1810 in 1993 to $3582 in 2007. These dollar
amounts include refundable EITC payments, any other refundable tax credits,
and refunds of overwithheld taxes. On average the tax refund amount is equal
to 30% of AGI for these ﬁlers, equivalent to roughly three and a half months
of income. Figure 1 indicates that low-income ﬁlers without children receive
much smaller refunds in all years. The gap between the average refund for
ﬁlers with and without children is never less than $1000, and averages $2042
over the 15-year period I consider.
2.2 Most EITC Payments are Distributed in February
My empirical strategy assumes not only that low-income ﬁlers with children
receive refunds that are large relative to their annual incomes, but that these
refunds are distributed within a narrow window of time. Evidence of this
pattern comes from various Monthly Treasury Statements published by the
Treasury Department’s Financial Management Service.3 Figure 2 shows the
share of annual refund payments made in each month of the year, averaging
across years 1998 through 2007. Pooling refunds paid to ﬁlers of any income
level, approximately 19% of all refund payments are made in February, 23%
in each of March and April, and 17% in May. The pattern of payments is
even more concentrated, and shifted somewhat earlier in the year, for returns
that include a refundable EITC payment. About 54% of refundable EITC
payments are made in February and 25% are made in March.4
The share of refund payments made in February has been increasing over
the time period I consider, particularly for EITC returns. February’s share of
refundable EITC payments has increased from 46% in 1998 to 58% in 2007.
Why are EITC-related refunds paid so early in the year? One explanation
is that, regardless of income level, ﬁlers receiving a refund tend to ﬁle earlier
than those with a balance due (Slemrod et al. 1997). A second explanation
3Reports are available at http://www.fms.treas.gov/mts/backissues.html.
4The entirety of a person’s refund is disbursed at one time, regardless of whether the
funds represent an EITC payment or a refund of overwithholding. Thus, while I do not
have information on the temporal pattern of all tax refunds made to EITC recipients, the
pattern of refundable EITC payments is a very good proxy.more speciﬁc to the EITC is that e-ﬁling is associated with an earlier refund
payment, and EITC returns have very high rates of e-ﬁling. Kopczuk and
Pop-Eleches (2007) show that even as early as 1999, 54% of EITC-claiming
returns were e-ﬁled. In contrast, the IRS Oversight Board (2008) shows that
the national average e-ﬁling rate in 1999 was around 25%.
Figure 2 documents the timing of IRS disbursements, but ﬁlers can receive
cash a few weeks earlier through the use of a refund anticipation loan (RAL).
A RAL is a ﬁnancial product similar to a payday loan, and is widely oﬀered by
paid tax preparers. Berube et al. (2002) ﬁnd that 39% of EITC recipients used
a RAL in 1999, and that 47% of all EITC dollars were distributed through
RALs. For a ﬁler who otherwise would have used direct deposit, a RAL reduces
the time between ﬁling and refund receipt by about two weeks. For a ﬁler who
otherwise would have received a check in the mail, a RAL reduces wait time
by about six weeks.
There are mechanisms through which a refund recipient could spread after-
tax income more smoothly across the year. An EITC recipient could take up
the Advance EITC option, and any ﬁler can adjust the level of taxes with-
held from her paycheck. Either of these options involves submitting paper-
work to an employer. In practice, these options are very rarely used. Jones
(2010a) shows that experimentally providing more information about the Ad-
vance EITC, simplifying the application process, and requiring employees to
make an active decision to either opt in or opt out of the program increased
Advance EITC participation rates by only a very small amount, from 0.3 to
1.2 percentage points. Jones (2010b) investigates the extent to which tax-
payers adjusted their withholding in response to the 1990s expansions in the
EITC. He ﬁnds a very precisely estimated zero adjustment, and can rule out
that EITC-eligible taxpayers adjust their withholding by more than 2 cents in
response to a $1 increase in the EITC beneﬁt level.2.3 EITC Recipients Spend Refunds Quickly
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) posit that the marginal propensity to consume out
of a large lump sum payment will be lower than the MPC out of an equivalent
stream of smaller, periodic payments. If so, receipt of a large tax refund may
facilitate saving among low-income households. Indeed, EITC recipients often
report a desire to channel a portion of their refunds to savings. Smeeding,
Ross, and O’Connor (2000) analyze the results of in-depth interviews with 650
EITC recipients from the Chicago area. About a third (32.5%) of recipients
intend to save part of their refund. At the same time, it is quite common
for recipients to anticipate spending a portion of the funds on short-term
expenses. 36.8% of respondents planned to spend part of their refund on
utilities, 34.0% intended to spend part on rent, and 20.8% planned to spend
part on food. Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano (2006) surveyed low-income ﬁlers
in Oklahoma who were given the opportunity to directly deposit part of their
tax refund into a savings account and to receive a check for the remainder.
About 27% expressed interest in participating in the refund-splitting program.
However, a much smaller share (15%) actually used direct deposit to divert
part of the refund into a savings account. Bronchetti et al. (2011) run a
ﬁeld experiment in which ﬁlers have the option of allocating part of their
tax refund to buying U.S. savings bonds. They investigate the sensitivity of
this decision to changes in the default. They ﬁnd that very few low-income
ﬁlers, about 9% of the sample, use part of their tax refund to buy savings
bonds. In an interesting contrast to earlier work on default rules, they ﬁnd
that changing the default option has virtually no eﬀect on this savings decision.
This evidence on the EITC and savings, along with estimates of the short-term
consumption response to refund receipt described in section 1.2, suggests that
EITC payments are spent down fairly quickly. Thus, an individual who enters
unemployment a few months after receiving a tax refund is unlikely to have
much of that refund payment still tucked away.
It is likely that EITC recipients quickly spend down their refund payments
because they face severe credit constraints. One piece of evidence consistent
with this explanation is the willingness of EITC recipients to borrow at thehigh eﬀective interest rates implicit in RAL pricing. Berube et al. (2002)
estimate an annualized interest rate of 250% for a typical RAL purchased in the
Washington D.C. area. Athreya, Reilly, and Simpson (2010) compare measures
of credit constraints for EITC-eligible households and for all other households
in the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances. EITC-eligible households are about
twice as likely to report being 60 days or more late with a debt payment (11.2%
vs. 5.4%), four times as likely to report having no checking account (28% vs.
7%) and more likely to have been denied a checking account because of a poor
credit history (2.3% vs. 0.5%).
3 Estimation Strategy
In order to test the hypothesis that unemployment spells beginning shortly
after refund receipt are longer than unemployment spells beginning at other
times of year, I estimate the hazard of exiting from an unemployment spell
into a new job. Speciﬁcally, I estimate Cox proportional hazard models of the
following form:
log(hit) = β1Feb Starti + β2WBAi + γXit + ϵit (6)
where h is the hazard rate and Feb Start is a dummy equal to one if an unem-
ployment spell begins in February. If in fact the extra cash-on-hand generated
by tax refunds reduces job search eﬀort as predicted by theory, the coeﬃcient
β1 will be negative. The variable WBAi represents the weekly beneﬁt amount
an individual can receive from his state’s UI program. The vector X includes
measures of age, race, marital status, number of children, pre-unemployment
wage and job tenure, net liquid wealth, the monthly state unemployment rate,
and a dummy for being on the seam between SIPP interviews.5 In my preferred
5In a given SIPP interview, respondents report a number of variables at monthly fre-
quency, corresponding to each of the last four months. The last month covered by an
interview is considered to be “on the seam.” There is a strong tendency for individuals to
report the same value for each of the months covered by an interview. Thus, changes within
the reference period are smoothed out, changes between interviews are exaggerated, and
transitions of all sorts, including out of unemployment, are particularly high for observa-speciﬁcations I include ﬁxed eﬀects for state of residence, calendar month and
year, and pre-unemployment industry. The calendar month variables con-
trol for other, non-tax-related seasonal patterns in unemployment duration. I
estimate the above equation for a sample of individuals likely to experience
particularly large tax-refund-related variation in cash-on-hand—parents with
low incomes and with no more than a high school degree.
My empirical strategy does not require individual-level information about
the amount of a person’s tax refund or the exact time at which she receives
it. While this information would be useful, it is also endogenous to behavior
that is plausibly correlated with determinants of job search eﬀort, including
observable variables such as labor income and unobservable variables such as
impatience. The exact amount of one’s refund depends on income and taxes
withheld throughout the year. The timing of refund receipt depends largely
on when a person ﬁles.
As ﬁgure 2 shows, the dollar value of EITC-related refund payments is
greater in February than in any other month, but is also quite high in March.
In some speciﬁcations I replace the indicator for beginning an unemployment
spell in February with an indicator for entering unemployment in either Febru-
ary or March.
There is a large body of literature, reviewed by Krueger and Meyer (2002),
establishing that individuals receiving more generous UI beneﬁts have longer
unemployment durations. This motivates the inclusion of WBAi, a measure of
the UI weekly beneﬁt amount potentially available to an individual. In most
speciﬁcations, I use the weekly beneﬁt amount that an individual could receive
based on her state of residence and earnings history. As an alternative I use
the average weekly beneﬁt amount disbursed in a state within a given year.
Details on state UI programs come from the Employment and Training Ad-
ministration of the U.S. Department of Labor. When analyzing the behavior
of low-income individuals, these measures of beneﬁt generosity are preferable
to the maximum weekly beneﬁt amount, which has often been used in the
UI literature. While diﬀerent maximum values do account for a substantial
tions on the seam.amount of the cross-state heterogeneity in beneﬁt generosity, EITC recipients
are generally earning too little to qualify for the maximum beneﬁt.
I do not control for the potential duration of UI beneﬁt receipt, because
there is very little variation in this parameter over the time period I consider.
Almost all state UI beneﬁt programs cap receipt at 26 weeks. The excep-
tions are Massachusetts (where the maximum duration of beneﬁt receipt is 30
weeks in all years of my analysis), Montana (28 weeks beginning in 2004), and
Washington (30 weeks prior to 2005). If a state’s insured unemployment rate
is above some threshold, a resident of that state can claim up to 13 weeks of
extended beneﬁts, funded jointly by the federal and state government, after
exhausting the state-only beneﬁts. The greatest variation in beneﬁt duration
during my analysis period comes from the Temporary Extended Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act, in eﬀect from March of 2002 until March of 2004.
Details on this program come from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2004).
Under this policy, workers in all states could receive up to 13 weeks of federally-
funded TEUC beneﬁts after exhausting the state component. If workers in
high-unemployment states exhausted the TEUC beneﬁts, they could receive
yet another 13 weeks of beneﬁts, known as TEUC-X beneﬁts. This variation
in potential beneﬁt duration, concentrated in a few years, will be absorbed by
the year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Including state ﬁxed eﬀects mitigates concerns that other state-speciﬁc at-
tributes or policies aﬀect seasonal variation in unemployment duration. One
such policy is the payroll tax states levy on employers to fund UI programs.
These taxes are partially experience rated. A ﬁrm’s marginal cost of laying oﬀ
a worker is generally increasing with the ﬁrm’s layoﬀ rate, but the ﬁrm’s cost
of layoﬀs rises less quickly than the beneﬁts paid to the ﬁrm’s former employ-
ees. The degree of experience rating diﬀers across states, and less complete
experience rating has been shown to increase the rate of temporary layoﬀs.6
6Card and Levine (1994) show that imperfect experience rating increases rates of tem-
porary unemployment more during times of low demand than during expansionary times.
This is true regardless of whether low demand is attributable to a trough in the business
cycle or to seasonal ﬂuctuations within an industry. The implication of this for my analysis
is that if February is a generally low-demand month, imperfect experience rating will resultLonger durations of unemployment may be desirable if additional search
time leads to higher-quality eventual matches. Previous research on whether
longer unemployment durations are associated with better subsequent jobs
has yielded mixed results. Addison and Blackburn (2000) ﬁnd no evidence
that, among UI recipients, more generous UI beneﬁts are associated with a
larger gain in wages. They ﬁnd limited evidence that UI recipients have larger
wage gains than non-recipients. Centeno (2004) ﬁnds that, for men, more
generous state UI beneﬁts are associated with longer post-unemployment job
tenure. This relationship is stronger when unemployment rates are high. Card,
Chetty, and Weber (2007) ﬁnd that Austrian workers who are just eligible for
severance pay or extended UI beneﬁts do not have greater wage gains or longer
duration on the next job, despite having longer spells of unemployment.
I test whether the wage gains associated with re-employment are higher
for those who enter unemployment in February. I estimate OLS regressions in
which the dependent variable is wage growth, deﬁned as:
Wage Growthi = log[Post-Unemp Wagei]   log[Pre-Unemp Wagei] (7)
The controls used in these equations include an indicator for beginning an
unemployment spell in February as well as most of the demographic controls
included in the hazard models. I do not include the pre-unemployment wage
as a control in these regressions. I also do not control for WBAi in these
regressions, as an individual’s potential beneﬁt amount is highly correlated
with his pre-unemployment wage. I also investigate whether beginning an un-
employment spell in February is associated with two other proxies for better
job quality, being paid a salary rather than being paid on an hourly basis
and working full-time rather than part-time. I measure pre-unemployment
job characteristics in the last full calendar month preceding entry into unem-
in more temporary layoﬀs at that time. This could result in longer duration for spells begin-
ning in February for reasons unrelated to tax refund receipt. Excluding spells of temporary
unemployment from my sample reduces this concern. Card and Levine ﬁnd a much smaller
relationship between the degree of experience rating and the unemployment rate excluding
temporary layoﬀs.ployment and post-unemployment job characteristics in the ﬁrst full month
following re-employment.
4 SIPP Data
I use data from the 1993, 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of the SIPP. Each of these
SIPP panels is a longitudinal survey that follows respondents for up to three
years (1993 and 2001 panels) or four years (1996 and 2004 panels). Interviews
take place every four months. Respondents report weekly labor force status,
allowing precise measurement of the times at which a person enters and exits
a spell of unemployment.
My deﬁnition of unemployment spells follows earlier work such as Cullen
and Gruber (2000) and Chetty (2008). An unemployment spell begins with
a transition from having a job (either working or temporarily absent without
pay) to having no job. A person is considered to remain in a spell of unem-
ployment until she reports having a job in which she subsequently works for at
least four consecutive weeks. I drop unemployment spells that correspond to a
temporary layoﬀ and spells in which there is no active search for a new job. To
focus on individuals with some demonstrated attachment to the labor force, I
restrict the sample to individuals with at least twelve weeks of work history
prior to the start of their ﬁrst observed unemployment spell. To minimize the
number of unemployment spells that end in a decision to retire, I restrict the
sample to individuals ages 20 to 64.7 As is common in this literature, I restrict
the sample to unemployment spells lasting no more than one year. My sam-
ple includes spells of unemployment beginning in calendar years 1993 through
2007.
To construct a sample of EITC-eligible individuals, I sum earnings from
the three calendar months preceding the month of entry into unemployment.
I restrict the sample to those whose combined own and spouse’s 3-month
7Chan and Stevens (2001) ﬁnd that only 70-75% of displaced workers in their 50s return
to work within two years, and even fewer displaced workers in their 60s return. My results
are robust to lowering the age cutoﬀ to 59, 54, or 49.earnings are greater than zero and less than $8250, measured in real 2007
dollars. Scaled up to annual earnings of $33,000, this roughly corresponds to
the top of the EITC-eligible income range for a family with one child in each
year of my analysis.8 I further restrict the sample to parents. My deﬁnition
of a parent reﬂects the conditions under which a person can claim an EITC-
qualifying child. I consider a person to be a parent if, in at least 6 months
out of the preceding year, she was living with one or more of her own children
under age 19. Finally, I restrict the sample to individuals whose highest level
of completed education is a high school degree or less.
These sample restrictions result in a set of 4181 unemployment spells, 1717
experienced by men and 2464 by women. It is not uncommon for an individual
to experience multiple spells of unemployment meeting the selection criteria.9
Each of these spells is counted as a separate observation, and standard errors
in all regressions are clustered at the person level.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for my sample, comparing unem-
ployment spells beginning in February to spells beginning in other months.10
Columns 1 and 2 show information for women and columns 4 and 5 are for
men. By construction, this is a low-income sample. On average, women in the
sample earned about $3060 in the three months prior to unemployment and
had an imputed hourly wage of $8.02.11 Men had average 3-month earnings of
8Scaling up three months of earnings yields a reasonable approximation of annual earn-
ings. For people with 12 months of observed pre-unemployment earnings, and who meet all
of my sample criteria other than the earnings restriction, 57% are income-eligible for my
sample using actual 12-month earnings or using 3-month earnings multiplied by four. 32%
are ineligible for my sample using either income measure, and 7% would be eligible based
on 12-month earnings but are ineligible using the scaled up 3-month earnings measure.
9There are 3294 unique individuals in my sample, with 21% experiencing multiple in-
cluded unemployment spells. Stevens (1997) analyzes the eﬀect of multiple job losses on
the earnings proﬁles of displaced workers, using PSID data from 1968-88. In her sample of
displaced household heads, 41% experienced multiple job displacements, and the probability
of a subsequent displacement was 10-12% in the two years following the ﬁrst displacement.
10Grouping together unemployment spells beginning in February and March and com-
paring them to unemployment spells beginning in the remaining ten months generates very
similar patterns. Results are available upon request.
11I impute hourly wage for all workers, because self-reported hourly wage is available only
for those who are paid on an hourly basis. I use data from the last full calendar month before
entry into unemployment in this calculation. I divide the monthly earnings associated withapproximately $4040 and imputed hourly wages of $9.41. On average, individ-
uals in my sample are eligible for about $140 in weekly UI beneﬁts, measured
in real 2007 dollars.12 This is lower than state-level average weekly beneﬁt
amounts, as expected for a low-income sample. Only about 22% of the unem-
ployment spells in my sample involve receipt of UI beneﬁts, and this value is
similar across groups entering unemployment at diﬀerent times of year. This
ﬁgure is consistent with other estimates of UI takeup. The CBO (2004) shows
that in recent years about 40% of all unemployed individuals collect UI bene-
ﬁts, and Levine (2005) documents a growing gap between the UI take-up rates
of high-skilled and low-skilled individuals. Using 2003 CPS data, Levine ﬁnds
a UI recipiency rate of 21% among unemployed individuals with less than a
high school degree, relative to a UI recipiency rate of 35% among unemployed
individuals with higher levels of education. Importantly for my empirical strat-
egy, none of the income-related variables have statistically diﬀerent means for
February unemployment entrants and for others.
Not surprisingly, wealth levels are also low for this sample. Net liquid
wealth is deﬁned as total wealth minus home equity, business equity, vehicle
a particular job by the number of hours worked in that month and job. Each respondent can
report earnings and hours information for up to two jobs per wave. I use data from job 1 in
most cases, and use data from job 2 only if the job 1 calculation produces a zero or missing
value. Workers report the typical number of hours worked per week, which I multiply by
four to estimate monthly hours of work. (As an alternative I have used the actual number of
weeks per month, which can be either four or ﬁve. However, using actual weeks per month
produces larger mean diﬀerences between imputed and self-reported hourly wages for the
approximately 84% of my sample paid hourly. It appears that most workers are assuming a
4-week month when they report monthly earnings from a job.) This calculation produces a
handful of extremely high imputed hourly wage rates. To reduce the inﬂuence of outliers, I
have topcoded imputed hourly wage at the 99th percentile of the wage distribution in each
panel. Topcoding instead at the maximum allowed value of self-reported hourly wage has
virtually no eﬀect on the results.
12I have calculated WBA using earnings from the three months prior to unemployment
entry, multiplied by four to approximate annual earnings. Most states use information on
quarterly earnings from the ﬁrst four of the ﬁve quarters before UI application to compute
beneﬁts. To check the accuracy of using scaled-up quarterly earnings to approximate annual
earnings, I compute an alternative WBA amount for individuals observed for 12 months
prior to unemployment entry. This alternative WBA calculation makes use of a full year of
earnings history. For the 2629 spells with the necessary data, the initial WBA calculation
yields a mean beneﬁt amount of $143 and the alternative calculation yields a mean beneﬁt
of $166. The correlation between the two WBA amounts is 0.647.equity, and unsecured debt. Asset and wealth variables are collected in periodic
topical modules. The number of times each topical module is included varies
across SIPP panels, from once in the 1993 panel to four times in the 1996 panel.
In the case of multiple wealth observations, I use the measure that most closely
pre-dates entry into unemployment. If there is no pre-unemployment measure
available, I use the earliest observation following entry into unemployment.
The infrequent collection of wealth data means that the available values for
February unemployment entrants are not necessarily measured in February,
and these wealth data are ill-suited for verifying that the liquid assets of EITC
recipients are higher in February than in other months. In fact net liquid
wealth is only $1047 for women who enter unemployment in February and
$3725 for women who enter unemployment in other months. The standard
deviation is large, and this diﬀerence in means by month of unemployment
entry is not signiﬁcant. Median net wealth is zero for men and women entering
unemployment in any month. These very low levels of net wealth are consistent
with the view that this sample faces severe liquidity constraints.
It is possible that individuals entering unemployment in February are leav-
ing short-term jobs associated with the holiday shopping season. If these
individuals have generally lower levels of human capital than workers leaving
more permanent jobs, they may have a longer average search time before reem-
ployment. Restricting my sample to individuals who have worked for at least
twelve weeks prior to their ﬁrst observed unemployment spell makes it unlikely
that holiday-season jobs are aﬀecting the results. As shown in Table 1, the
mean number of weeks worked prior to unemployment is not statistically dif-
ferent for women entering unemployment in February than for women entering
unemployment at other times. Among men, unemployment spells beginning
in February are preceded by longer working spells than are unemployment
spells beginning in other months. It should be noted that the measure of pre-
unemployment job tenure is left censored at the time a person ﬁrst enters the
SIPP.
My estimation strategy relies on the assumption that individuals who enter
unemployment in February are similar to individuals who enter unemploymentat other times of year, except for the fact that they receive tax refunds at ap-
proximately the start of their unemployment spells. The summary statistics
in Table 1 provide some reassurance on this point, but it is important to
rule out other possible diﬀerences between the two groups. It is quite plausi-
ble that both seasonal patterns of layoﬀ and average unemployment duration
diﬀer across industries. Table 2 compares the pre-unemployment industry
of sample members entering unemployment at diﬀerent times of year. The
industry mix is generally similar for people who begin unemployment spells
around the time of tax refund receipt and for people who begin unemployment
spells at other times, with February entrants somewhat less likely to have been
employed in Administration. Overall, Table 2 suggests that longer unemploy-
ment durations among those entering unemployment in February are not a
result of February entrants being disproportionately drawn from particular in-
dustries. Even so, I control for pre-unemployment industry in my preferred
hazard model speciﬁcation.
To further investigate the possibility that February entrants diﬀer from
others, I estimate linear probability models predicting that an unemployment
spell begins in February rather than in some other month of the year. The
lower the predictive power of these regressions, the more plausible the argu-
ment that recent tax refund receipt is responsible for any February eﬀect on
unemployment duration. The results of these regressions are shown in columns
3 and 6 of Table 1. In addition to the controls reported in the table, I include
a set of year, state, month of entry into the SIPP, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.13
Reassuringly, demographics and income-related measures are very poor pre-
dictors of February unemployment entrance. However, among women, both
the observed length of the pre-unemployment job and an indicator for whether
that job tenure is censored are signiﬁcant predictors of beginning an unem-
ployment spell in February. The results are quite similar if I predict February
unemployment entrances using a probit model rather than a linear probability
13Because my sample selection rule requires 12 observed weeks of work prior to an unem-
ployment spell, the month ﬁrst observed in the SIPP aﬀects the set of months in which any
transition to unemployment can satisfy my sample criteria.model.
Before turning to results, I present one other piece of descriptive informa-
tion. Figure 3 plots the average duration of unemployment spells for women in
my sample, by month of entry into unemployment. Generally, spells beginning
in the early part of the year last longer than spells beginning in the second
half of the year. Spells beginning in February last longer than spells begin-
ning in any other month of the year. A similar pattern appears if I restrict
the sample to women included in the richest hazard models, those individuals
with non-missing state of residence and wealth variables.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
I ﬁrst present graphical evidence on job-ﬁnding rates. Figures 4 and 5 plot
Kaplan-Meier survival curves for men and women in my sample. Separate
curves are plotted for individuals who begin their spells of unemployment
in February (indicated by the more lightly shaded line) and for individuals
who enter unemployment in some other month. Among women, those who
enter unemployment in February have lower hazards of job-ﬁnding. The sur-
vival curve for February entrants is always above the survival curve for other
entrants, showing that the probability of remaining in unemployment after
t weeks is always higher for those who entered unemployment in February.
Equality of the February and other-month survival curves for women is re-
jected with p = 0.0049. Among men, there is no evidence that the hazard of
re-employment diﬀers with the month of entry into unemployment.
Coeﬃcients from hazard model estimates are shown in Tables 3 (women)
and 4 (men). Columns 1 and 4 show results from the simplest hazard models,
controlling only for the time of entry into unemployment and for being on
the seam between interviews. Columns 2 and 5 add a set of demographic
controls, the monthly state unemployment rate, and an individual’s potentialweekly UI beneﬁt amount.14 Columns 3 and 6 add year, month, state, and
industry ﬁxed eﬀects. This is my preferred speciﬁcation. Among women, there
is evidence that spells beginning around the time of refund receipt last longer
than spells beginning at other times of year. In all speciﬁcations, the hazard
of re-employment is signiﬁcantly lower for unemployment spells that begin
in February. The Feb Start coeﬃcient of -0.306 in column 3 indicates that
the re-employment hazard rate of February entrants is exp( 0.306) = 74% of
the re-employment hazard of those entering unemployment at other times of
the year. The hazard of re-employment is about 13 percent lower for spells
beginning in either February or March than for spells beginning at other times.
Table 4 shows no evidence that men’s hazard of exiting from unemployment
diﬀers with month of entry. This is not simply because a smaller sample of
low-income, low-education men with children generates less precise estimates.
The size of the standard errors for men and women is similar, and the point
estimates on the Feb Start term for men are quite close to zero. A speciﬁca-
tion that pools unemployment spells of men and women and that includes an
interaction of the Feb Start and female variables conﬁrms that the eﬀect of
starting an unemployment spell in February is statistically diﬀerent for men
and women.
It is perhaps not surprising that refund-related cash-on-hand appears to
aﬀect the search behavior of women only. Historically married women’s labor
supply has been more wage-elastic than men’s (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999),
although this gap narrowed substantially between 1980 and 2000 (Blau and
Kahn 2007; Heim 2007). It seems plausible that women’s job search eﬀort
would also be more sensitive to the level of cash-on-hand. To further inves-
tigate the diﬀerence, I have tried splitting the sample into groups of primary
and secondary earners rather than into groups of men and women. I classify
14The sample size falls when these controls are added because state of residence is missing
for some observations. In the 1996 and 2001 panels, residents of Maine and Vermont are
grouped together as are residents of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. In the
1993 panel, there are three composite state categories. One includes Maine and Vermont,
the second includes Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota, and the third includes Alaska,
Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. Other observations with missing imputed hourly wage or
missing wealth variables are also dropped.all unmarried individuals as primary earners. I classify a married individual
as a primary earner if she earns more than her spouse in the three months
prior to unemployment entry. I ﬁnd that only among secondary earners are
February unemployment entrances associated with longer spells.
I can separately identify the eﬀect of starting an unemployment spell in
February and of a particular week of a spell falling within the month of Febru-
ary, given that spells often persist beyond the month in which they start.
I have done this by including a full set of calendar month dummies in the
speciﬁcations shown in columns 3 and 6 of Tables 3 and 4. This helps to
address concerns about non-tax-related seasonal patterns in re-employment
hazard rates. December is a month of low re-employment hazards for women
and the last quarter of the year is associated with lower re-employment haz-
ards for men. The February coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
for women or for men. This in combination with the Feb Start coeﬃcient
suggests that it is tax refund receipt at the beginning of an unemployment
spell, rather than at any point during an unemployment spell, that has an
important inﬂuence on spell length. One possible explanation for this pattern
is that extra cash-on-hand may delay the commencement of active search at
the beginning of an unemployment spell but that it is less likely to interrupt
a period of active search already underway. This interpretation is supported
by the rarity of an unemployment spell involving a pattern in which a week
or more of looking for work is followed by a week or more of not working and
not looking, followed in turn by a week or more of active search. Only 8.5% of
women’s unemployment spells and 6.1% of men’s unemployment spells in my
sample include this pattern. Spells that include at least one week in February
are no more likely to include this pattern than are spells including at least
one week in any other calendar month of the year. Next I consider the share
of unemployment spells that include active search within the ﬁrst week: 69%
of female unemployment spells beginning in February and 76% of female un-
employment spells beginning in other months. This comparison goes in the
direction consistent with tax refund receipt delaying the start of active search,
and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.The coeﬃcients on other regressors are generally as expected. Among
both men and women, unemployment spells are shorter for whites than for
non-whites. Being married is associated with longer unemployment duration
for women but has no eﬀect on the unemployment duration of men. Being on
the seam between interviews is always associated with a dramatically higher
rate of exit from unemployment.15 In some speciﬁcations for men, a more
generous weekly beneﬁt amount is associated with a higher hazard of exit
from unemployment. This appears to contradict the conventional wisdom that
more generous UI beneﬁts result in longer spells of unemployment. However,
Levine (1993) points out that if a more generous beneﬁt level reduces the
search intensity of UI recipients, it can shorten the unemployment duration of
non-recipient searchers by essentially reducing their competition. This sort of
spillover could be important in my sample in which only 22% of unemployment
spells involve UI receipt.
5.2 Robustness Checks
By comparing unemployment entrances occurring in February to unemploy-
ment entrances occurring in all other months of the year taken together, the
results in Tables 3 and 4 may miss other important seasonal variation in un-
employment duration. I have estimated an alternative hazard model in which
I include a set of 11 starting-month dummies, one for beginning an unem-
ployment spell in each month of the year. (July is the omitted month.) The
coeﬃcients on these month dummies and the corresponding 95% conﬁdence
intervals, for women, are plotted in Figure 6. The job-ﬁnding hazard is lower
for spells that begin in February than for spells beginning in any other month.
One caveat about this ﬁgure is that because of the small number of observa-
tions in a given month, the precision of the estimated month coeﬃcients is low.
I have estimated a similar hazard model with 11 starting-month dummies for
men. There is no evidence that beginning an unemployment spell around the
15The coeﬃcients on this variable are similar to coeﬃcients on a “last month of wave”
dummy in unemployment duration models for disadvantaged single mothers estimated by
Ham, Li, and Shore-Sheppard (2009).time of refund receipt has any eﬀect on the unemployment duration of men.
None of the 11 starting-month coeﬃcients is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
While February is the modal month of refund receipt for EITC recipients,
non-trivial EITC refund payments are made in January, March, and April. By
essentially treating all unemployment entrances in months other than February
as part of a control group, assumed to be unaﬀected by tax refund receipt, I
may be biasing my estimates downwards. To address this point, I try dropping
unemployment spells that begin in January, March, or April. In this case, I can
be more conﬁdent that a comparison of February entrances to other entrances
is a comparison of spells beginning with and without recent tax refund receipt.
The results of this exercise are shown in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5. There
is again evidence that beginning an unemployment spell around the time of
refund receipt lengthens unemployment durations for women but not for men.
For women, the coeﬃcient of -0.361 indicates that the re-employment haz-
ard for February entrants is only 70% of the re-employment hazard for other
entrants.
To this point, I have restricted my sample to individuals who have no more
than a high school education. Similar restrictions have been used in other pa-
pers studying EITC-eligible individuals, but are not part of the tax law deter-
mining EITC eligibility. In columns 2 and 5 of Table 5 I expand my sample to
individuals of any education level, as long as they meet other selection crite-
ria. This is still a low-income sample, as I maintain the selection criterion that
real earnings (of the individual and his or her spouse) over the previous three
months are not greater than $8250. In this speciﬁcation, the Feb Start point
estimate for women falls substantially, but is still statistically diﬀerent from
zero. The results for women indicate that not only are low levels of education
associated with longer unemployment spells, but they are also associated with
a greater sensitivity of duration to cash-on-hand. For men, evidence from the
larger sample again indicates that beginning an unemployment spell around
the time of tax refund receipt has no eﬀect on unemployment duration.
If in fact the February eﬀect on unemployment duration is driven by tax
refund receipt, the eﬀect should be larger for individuals receiving larger taxrefunds. I use information on number of children and the earnings of sample
members and their spouses to predict the size of EITC payments. I then add an
interaction of the Feb Start dummy and the predicted EITC amount, measured
in thousands of dollars, to investigate whether those eligible for larger EITC
payments display a stronger seasonal pattern in unemployment duration. In
these speciﬁcations I include individuals with and without children. Those
without children are ineligible for the EITC before 1994, and are eligible for
only a small EITC in later years. The mean predicted EITC value for childless
women in the sample is $177, compared to a mean value of $2344 for women
with children. The results in column 3 of Table 5 show that beginning an
unemployment spell in February has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on duration among
women ineligible for the EITC. The larger a woman’s potential EITC, the
more negative the eﬀect of a February entrance on the re-employment hazard.16
Column 6 shows that men’s unemployment duration is unaﬀected by beginning
a spell in February, regardless of the size of an individual’s EITC payment.
Although the sample sizes are very small, I have also estimated models relying
on variation in EITC generosity for February entrants only. This speciﬁcation
also indicates that larger EITC values are associated with lower re-employment
hazards for women, with a coeﬃcient of -0.173 (0.107) on the predicted EITC
value. This estimate comes from a sample of only 312 unemployment spells of
women and thus should be treated with caution.
The pattern of results in Tables 3 and 4 is robust to alternative methods
of identifying parents. There are some complications involved in identifying
parents in the SIPP. In the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels, both the mother
and the father of each household member can be identiﬁed, if they live in
the same household. In the 1993 panel, only one parent is identiﬁed. To
compute the number of children a person has, I count up all the under-19
members of a household who list that person as a parent. For observations
16I have also estimated a speciﬁcation including a full set of starting-month dummies and
the interaction of each of these dummies with an individual’s predicted EITC amount. For
women the coeﬃcient on the February interaction term is -0.086, with a standard error of
0.052. None of the other month interaction terms is close to signiﬁcant at conventional
levels.from the 1993 panel, I also assign to a married person the number of children
listing his spouse as a parent, and to unmarried partners of the household
reference person I assign the number of children listing the reference person
as a parent. This method results in somewhat fewer identiﬁed parents in the
1993 panel than in later panels. As a robustness check, I apply the 1993
method of identifying parents to later panels. This change has virtually no
eﬀect on the results. To mirror the tax code’s deﬁnition of an EITC-qualifying
child, my baseline deﬁnition of a parent requires living with a child for at least
six months before unemployment, or for all observed months for those with
fewer than six months observed prior to unemployment entry. As a further
robustness check, I count a person as a parent if he or she was living with an
under-19 child at the time of entry into unemployment, ignoring information
on household composition in the previous ﬁve months. In this speciﬁcation, the
Feb Start coeﬃcient for women is -0.249 with a standard error of 0.107. The
pattern of results is also robust to identifying EITC income-eligible households
in diﬀerent ways. My baseline approach uses earnings from the three months
prior to entry into unemployment. If instead I use 12 months of earnings, my
sample size falls by about 25% but the Feb Start coeﬃcient is essentially the
same. It varies between -0.246 and -0.248 across diﬀerent parent deﬁnitions
and is always signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
I have tried a number of other speciﬁcations not reported in the tables. Re-
placing an individual’s own weekly UI beneﬁt amount with the average weekly
amount paid in her state and year has virtually no eﬀect on the results. I have
looked for heterogeneity in the eﬀect of entering unemployment in February.
There is not a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the responses of single and married
women, nor is the response signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for whites and non-whites.
The evidence presented by Chetty (2008) suggests that the eﬀect of cash-on-
hand should be largest for those with the lowest levels of liquid assets. I have
tried interacting the Feb Start term with an indicator for having net liquid
assets less than or equal to zero. Approximately 75% of the sample falls into
this group. I do not ﬁnd that the February eﬀect is signiﬁcantly larger among
this group than among those with positive net liquid assets. However, nearlyeveryone in my sample could reasonably be considered liquidity constrained.
5.3 Falsiﬁcation Tests
It is possible that unemployment spells beginning in February are longer than
unemployment spells beginning at other times of year for reasons unrelated
to tax refund receipt. While it is diﬃcult to rule this out conclusively, the
absence of a February eﬀect for groups of individuals unlikely to be receiving
large refunds in February makes such a story less plausible.
I consider three groups who are similar to my primary sample in many
ways but who receive smaller average refunds. First I consider individuals
who appear to have no EITC-qualifying children, but who otherwise meet my
sample criteria. Next I consider individuals who have children but who are
earning too much to be eligible for the EITC. I use a sample of individuals with
real 3-month earnings of $8250 to $16500, corresponding to annual incomes
of $33,000 to $66,000. Tax return data indicate that, over the years 1993
to 2007, ﬁlers in this group received refunds equal to 5.5% of their AGI on
average. Finally, I apply my baseline sample deﬁnition to data from the 1984,
1985, and 1986 panels of the SIPP. The EITC existed during this time period
but was substantially less generous than it became in later years. Results
of hazard model estimates for each of these three groups are shown in Table
6. In these samples entering unemployment in February is not associated
with signiﬁcantly longer unemployment duration. Standard errors are large,
though, and 95% conﬁdence intervals generally include the point estimate for
my primary sample.
5.4 Eﬀects on Job Quality
Given that beginning an unemployment spell around the time of tax refund
receipt is associated with longer unemployment spells for low-income women
with children, I next investigate whether these longer searches result in better
eventual search outcomes. Sample sizes are smaller here because not all spells
in my sample end with re-employment, and because measures of job qualityare missing for some employed respondents.
Results of wage growth regressions for women are shown in column 1 of
Table 7. There is no evidence that unemployment spells beginning in Febru-
ary are associated with greater wage growth. In column 2 I use an indi-
cator for whether a job pays an hourly wage as a measure of lower-quality
employment. In this speciﬁcation I also control for whether an individual’s
pre-unemployment job paid an hourly wage. There is substantial persistence
in having employment compensated on an hourly basis. Entering an unem-
ployment spell in February has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on whether one’s post-
unemployment compensation is hourly. In column 3 the dependent variable
is a dummy equal to one if the usual number of hours worked per week in
the post-unemployment job is greater than 40. Using this as a proxy for job
quality is motivated by the fact that full-time jobs typically oﬀer higher hourly
pay than part-time jobs (Hirsch 2005), and that full-time jobs are more likely
to provide health insurance beneﬁts (Farber and Levy 2000). Unemployment
spells beginning in February are no more likely to end with a full-time job
than are unemployment spells beginning in other months of the year.
The absence of any positive eﬀect on job quality measures is not particu-
larly surprising, for at least three reasons. First, the extra search time associ-
ated with a February entrance into unemployment is only about four weeks.
Second, this group of individuals with at most a high school degree faces gener-
ally limited labor market opportunities. Finally, other researchers have found
little eﬀect of longer unemployment spells on wage gains, even for samples
drawn from a broader range of education levels (Addison and Blackburn 2000;
Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007).
6 Conclusion
Low-income ﬁlers with children receive large tax refunds in a concentrated
period of time. On average, the tax refunds of EITC-eligible parents are
equivalent to about three and a half months of income. More than half of all
refundable EITC payments are distributed in the month of February. Thispaper highlights a previously unexplored impact of this concentrated delivery
of tax refunds. For mothers with low levels of income and education, the addi-
tional cash-on-hand from a tax refund lengthens unemployment spells. Among
these women, unemployment spells beginning in February have a 26% lower
hazard of re-employment and are about four weeks longer than unemployment
spells beginning at other times of year.
Tax refund payments provide liquidity but, unlike UI beneﬁts, do not
change the return to a marginal unit of work. Although a ﬁler’s EITC pay-
ment is a function of her annual earnings, the amount is predetermined by
the time the tax refund arrives. Thus, in the framework developed by Chetty
(2008), tax refund payments lengthen unemployment spells not through moral
hazard but by relaxing liquidity constraints. Given the evidence in this paper
of a strong relationship between cash-on-hand and unemployment duration for
low-income women with children, it is likely that making UI beneﬁts more gen-
erous for this group would increase unemployment duration by further easing
credit constraints. Such an increase in generosity would likely allow greater
consumption smoothing for low-income mothers, which could have positive
eﬀects for their children.
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The sample is restricted to returns with AGI>0 and AGI<$33,000, measured in real 2007
dollars. Mean refund amounts are reported in real 2007 dollars. A ﬁling unit is classiﬁed as
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This ﬁgure uses data from Monthly Treasury Statements covering years 1998 through 2007.
For each year, I compute the share of annual refund payments disbursed in each calendar
month. The ﬁgure shows the 10-year average of each month’s share.
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This ﬁgure shows mean unemployment duration, in weeks, for unemployment spells of
women. Included individuals are ages 20 to 64, lived with one or more own children prior
to unemployment, had earnings (own earnings or own plus spouse’s earnings if married)
less than $8250 in the three months prior to unemployment, and worked at least 12 weeks
prior to unemployment. Unemployment spells that are temporary layoﬀs or that contain no
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Month of Unemployment Entry
The ﬁgure plots the point estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals for variables indicating the
month of entry into unemployment, from a hazard model including demographic controls and
a set of year, state, industry, current calendar year and current calendar month dummies.
July is the omitted month.Table 1: Comparing Unemployment Spells by Month Of Entry
Women Men
Means Predicting Means Predicting
Feb Other Feb Start Feb Other Feb Start
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 32.6 32.1 0.001 34.8 33.6 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Age Squared -0.00002 -6.3010−6
(0.00007) (0.00007)
% White 71.1 65.5 0.009 78.5 83.5 -0.027
(0.012) (0.021)
% Married 30.1 28.6 -0.007 78.6 76.0 -0.003
(0.013) (0.016)
Number of Kids 1.9 1.9 -0.002 2.2 2.0** 0.010
(0.005) (0.007)
Own Earnings, Previous 3040 3064 5.9610−6 4306 4016 8.2810−7
3 Months (6.3610−6) (9.0210−6)
Imputed Hourly Wage 7.73 8.04 -0.00009 9.15 9.44 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Potential Weekly UI Beneﬁt 122 129 3.8810−6 172 162 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Pre-Unemp Job Tenure 38.7 39.4 -0.0008*** 49.4 43.0* -0.00006
(Weeks) (0.0002) (0.0002)
% with Job Tenure 28.8 28.2 0.065*** 31.9 34.3 0.005
Censored (0.016) (0.017)
Annual Unemp Rate 5.4 5.3 0.014 5.6 5.5 0.025*
(0.010) (0.013)
Mean Net Liquid Wealth 1047 3725 -4.9110−8 747 3088 -3.6010−7*
(9.1710−8) (2.1310−7)
Median Net Liquid Wealth 0 0 0 0
Spell Included UI Receipt 19.1 19.9 24.4 24.8
Mean Duration (Weeks) 21.0 17.2*** 15.0 14.6
N 174 2290 2288 131 1586 1575
R2 0.060 0.110
Stars in columns 2 and 5 indicate a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in means relative to the previous column. Sample sizes are
somewhat smaller for imputed wage, potential weekly UI beneﬁt, net liquid wealth, and annual unemployment rate.
Stars in columns 3 and 6 indicate statistical signiﬁcance of a regression coeﬃcient. The regressions in columns 3 and
6 also include ﬁxed eﬀects for year, state, pre-unemployment industry, and calendar month ﬁrst observed in the SIPP.
All dollar amounts are in real 2007 values.Table 2: Pre-Unemployment Industry, by Month Of Entry
Women Men
Feb Other Feb Other
Construction 1.0 0.9 25.6 22.4
Manufacturing 12.8 13.3 14.6 16.2
Wholesale Trade 4.4 3.0 8.1 3.4
Retail Trade 14.9 16.9 14.4 10.7
Transportation 1.7 1.8 2.3 4.4
Administration 3.6 7.5*** 4.1 7.4*
Education Services 1.6 2.0 0.4 1.0
Health Services 14.7 13.0 1.0 1.8
Accommodation, Food Services 24.7 19.0 7.6 6.9
Other Services 3.0 4.3 5.6 5.5
Other Industry 17.5 18.4 16.4 20.2
Stars indicate a signiﬁcant diﬀerence across the preceding two columns. Those with a missing
value for pre-unemployment industry are placed in the other industry category.Table 3: Hazard Model Estimates, Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Feb Start -0.267*** -0.279*** -0.306***
(0.092) (0.096) (0.099)
F/M Start -0.137** -0.124* -0.129*
(0.067) (0.068) (0.071)
On Seam 1.792*** 1.775*** 1.720*** 1.794*** 1.777*** 1.722***
(0.057) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059)
Age 0.039* 0.041* 0.041* 0.043*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Age Squared -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006** -0.0006*
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
White 0.222*** 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.206***
(0.060) (0.065) (0.060) (0.065)
Married -0.076 -0.104* -0.077 -0.107*
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Number of Kids -0.018 -0.007 -0.018 -0.006
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Pre-Unemployment Wage 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
WBA 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Pre-Unemp Job Tenure -0.002* 0.001 -0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Pre-Unemp Job Censored 0.220*** 0.002 0.222*** 0.004
(0.058) (0.075) (0.058) (0.075)
Net Liquid Wealth -2.2310 7 -4.0610 7 -2.3310 7 -4.2010 7
(4.5410 7) (4.9610 7) (4.5510 7) (4.9510 7)
Unemp Rate -0.065*** -0.034 -0.065*** -0.033























Fixed Eﬀects (Year, State, Industry) Yes Yes
Number of Spells 2464 2288 2288 2464 2288 2288
The table reports coeﬃcients from hazard models. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, are in parentheses.
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.Table 4: Hazard Model Estimates, Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Feb Start -0.067 -0.030 0.044
(0.119) (0.120) (0.114)
F/M Start -0.021 0.015 0.041
(0.078) (0.083) (0.085)
On Seam 1.952*** 1.876*** 1.854*** 1.951*** 1.876*** 1.854***
(0.061) (0.064) (0.064) (0.061) (0.064) (0.064)
Age -0.054** -0.043** -0.054** -0.044**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Age Squared 0.0006** 0.0005* 0.0006** 0.0005*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
White 0.322*** 0.386*** 0.324*** 0.385***
(0.092) (0.099) (0.093) (0.099)
Married 0.001 -0.010 0.0002 -0.009
(0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076)
Number of Kids 0.038 0.003 0.037 0.003
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029)
Pre-Unemployment Wage -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
WBA 0.0007* 0.0003 0.0007* 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Pre-Unemp Job Tenure -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Pre-Unemp Job Censored -0.002 -0.138 -0.00004 -0.138
(0.069) (0.083) (0.069) (0.083)
Net Liquid Wealth -1.4710 6 -8.5110 7 -1.4610 6 -8.3910 7
(1.3210 6) (1.4510 6) (1.3210 6) (1.4510 6)
Unemp Rate -0.065** -0.049 -0.065** -0.049























Fixed Eﬀects (Year, State, Industry) Yes Yes
Number of Spells 1717 1575 1575 1717 1575 1575
The table reports coeﬃcients from hazard models. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, are in parentheses.
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.Table 5: Alternative Speciﬁcations
Women Men
Dropping All EITC Dropping All EITC
Jan, March, Ed Dollar Jan, March, Ed Dollar
April Levels Value April Levels Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Feb Start -0.361*** -0.161** -0.080 -0.034 0.019 0.022
(0.106) (0.074) (0.091) (0.119) (0.094) (0.080)
HS Grad or Less -0.160*** -0.209***
(0.044) (0.056)
Feb Start  EITC -0.084* -0.013
Value (1000s) (0.046) (0.044)
Number of Spells 1741 3708 4304 1191 2171 5436
The table reports coeﬃcients from hazard models. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, are in parentheses.
All speciﬁcations include demographic controls and a full set of year, month, state, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 6: Hazard Model Estimates for Groups with Smaller Average Refunds
Women Men
No Kids Higher Earlier No Kids Higher Earlier
Income Years Income Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Feb Start -0.093 -0.058 0.016 0.036 0.114 -0.140
(0.105) (0.145) (0.220) (0.083) (0.132) (0.184)
Number of Spells 1852 884 761 3617 1059 667
The table reports coeﬃcients from hazard models. Standard errors, clustered at the person level, are in parentheses.
All speciﬁcations include demographic controls and a full set of year, month, state, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns
2 and 5 include individuals whose combined real own and spouse’s earnings in the three months prior to unemployment
were between $8250 and $16500. Columns 3 and 6 include parents who satisfy the criteria for inclusion in the main
sample, but who are observed in the 1984, 1985, or 1986 SIPP.Table 7: Eﬀects on Job Quality, Women
Dependent Variable
Wage Growth Paid Hourly Full Time
(1) (2) (3)







N 1596 1823 1747
The table reports coeﬃcients from OLS regressions. Standard errors, clustered at the person
level, are in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and
*** at the 1% level.